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I. INTRODUCTION

Legal authorities have long recognized that the state has an
affirmative duty to protect an individual when a special relationship
exists between the state and that individual. However, many courts
t
B.A. University of Minnesota; J.D. William Mitchell College of Law,
expected 2003.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(4) (1965) (stating that when a
third party is required by law to take custody of an individual and deprives that
individual of his normal opportunities for protection, the third party is under a
duty of reasonable care to protect that individual against an unreasonable risk of
physical harm); see also 60 AM. JUR. 2D Penal and CorrectionalInstitutions § 174
(1987). "Ajailer ...owes a duty to the prisoner to keep him safe from unnecessary
harm, and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the prisoner's life and
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still consider an individual's intentional act as a superseding cause
if the act causes self-inflicted injury, and often apply a comparative
fault standard to determine the state's level of liability. It is only in
"exceptional circumstances" - situations where the individual's
mental condition is such that he is unable to care for himself, and a
third party has assumed liability for the individual's actions because
of the individual's mental condition - where the individual's
2
actions are ignored and fault shifts entirely to that third party.
Recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court had an opportunity to
define the limits of these "exceptional" relationships. Instead, the
court presented an enigma. In Sandborg v. Blue Earth County,4 the
court ruled that if self-inflicted injury is reasonably foreseeable in a
jail setting, the fault of the actor should not be compared,
regardless of the actor's mental state.5 In effect, the Sandborg
decision expanded the government's liability in suicide situations,6
while completely eliminating the fault of the actual wrongdoer.
This was a standard that, uP until Sandborg, had only been applied
to mental health experts. Even then, it was only used on rare
occasions."
This note examines the development of the exceptional
relationship in this country between an incapacitated individual
and those in control of his well being. The note also explores the
health." Id.
2. Jain v. State, 617 N.W.2d 293, 300 (Iowa 2000) (holding that the state-run
university was not liable for a student who committed suicide in his dorm room,
the court found that "the district court logically concluded that because no legallyrecognized special relationship existed between the university and [the victim],
plaintiff [sic] could not rely on the exception to the intervening-superseding cause
doctrine to counter the university's affirmative defense"); McMahon v. St. Croix
Falls Sch. Dist., 596 N.W.2d 875, 879 (Wis. Ct. App.1999) (finding that, when a
student committed suicide and the school district did not inform the parents of
his absence, "suicide constitutes an intervening force which breaks the line of
causation from the wrongful act to the death and therefore the wrongful act does
not render the defendant civilly liable.").
3. Sandborg v. Blue Earth County, 615 N.W.2d 61, 64 (Minn. 2000)
[hereinafter Sandborg I1].
4. Id. at 61.
5. Id. at 64. The supreme court stated that mental illness is "a factor to
consider when determining whether the suicide was reasonably foreseeable," but it
is "not necessary in making a determination regarding the applicability of
comparative fault." Id.
6. Id. In a 'jailer-detainee relationship... the duty to protect against a
known possibility of self-inflicted harm transfers entirely to the jailer, and
comparing the fault of the detainee is therefore not appropriate." Id.
7. Tomfohr v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d. 121,125 (Minn. 1990).
8. Id.
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recent decisions concerning this matter in Minnesota. The third
section examines the Minnesota Supreme Court's holding in
Sandborg, while the fourth section analyzes the ruling and its
potential consequences. The note concludes that the court has
articulated a vague and potentially dangerous over-extension of an
otherwise realistic legal theory.
II. HISTORY OF SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS IN TORT LAW

A. The Development of Special Relationsfor Suicide
Though special relationships have been recognized for years in
all jurisdictions,9 holding a third party civily liable for another's
suicide is a relatively recent development. The reason for the
courts' reluctance to shift liability is that the courts have
traditionally considered suicide to be a deliberate, intentional act,
and therefore solely the responsibility of the actor."
Furthermore, in regard to state-run institutions, the courts
were still clinging to archaic legal doctrines that relieved the
government from virtually all liability." Due to the concept of
9. Stephen Faberman, Note, The Lessons of DeShaney: Special Relationships,
Schools & the Fifth Circuit, 35 B.C. L. REV.97, 103 (1993) (stating that a duty has
long existed "when the state has incarcerated or institutionalized an individual, so
as to deprive the individual of the ability to protect himself or herself'); see
genearlly Bessemer Land & Improvement Co. v. Campbell, 25 So. 793 (Ala. 1898)
(holding employers liable in situations where employees need aid); Yu v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 144 A.2d 56 (Conn. 1958) (holding that
carriers have a special duty to aid passengers who are known to be in peril);
Farmer v. State, 79 So.2d 528 (Miss. 1955) (holding a special relationship exists
between jailers and prisoners when a prisoner is in danger).
10. Victor E. Schwartz, Civil Liabilityfor Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and
Psychiatry, 24 VAND. L. REv. 217, 217 (1971) (noting that in 1971, the number of
cases involving liability for the suicide of another, as well as the number of courts
accepting the theory behind this liability, was rising); see also Meier v. Ross Gen.
Hosp., 445 P.2d 519, 522-23 (Cal. 1968) (holding liable "those charged with care
and treatment of mentally disturbed patients... [if] they could reasonably
conclude that the patient would be likely to harm himself"); Fernandez v. Baruch,
244 A.2d 109, 112 (N.J. 1968) (holding that determining liability for failure to
prevent a suicide is based on whether the self-inflicted harm could reasonably have
been anticipated).
11. Schwartz, supra note 10, at 217 (recognizing that even though holding
someone "civilly liable for causing the suicide of another" seems a "paradox," a
growing number of courts are recognizing third-party fault).
12. See Christina M. Royer, Comment, ParadiseLost? State Employee's Rights in
the Wake of "New Federalism,'" 34 AKRON L. REv. 637, 642-43 & n.26 (2001) (noting
that the Supreme Court reinforced notions of governmental immunity from
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sovereign immunity, courts were reluctant to place any sort of tort
liability on the government until the middle part of the twentieth
century.13 In fact, it was not until the Federal Torts Claims Act of
194614 that the courts began to establish specific grounds in which
the federal government could be held liable for a government
employee's negligent actions.15 Although New York abolished
sovereign immunity in 1929, most states did not do so until after
the federal government did so in 1946.'
For government-run hospitals, the respective torts claims acts
meant imposing liability for negligently running and maintaining
hospitals.
This soon encompassed acting negligently when
English law in cases such as Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), where the Court
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment as a shield to protect both federal and state
governments from tort liability in actions taken by its citizens); see also Emanuel
Margolis, U.S. Supreme Court at '99: Jurisprudenceor ImprudentJurists?, 73 CONN. B.J.
409, 427 n.48 (1999) (arguing that, in this day and age, it seems ludicrous "to
argue that the immunity of 'the Crown' from suit had any place in the thinking of
those who had rebelled against the tyranny and abuses of King George and
Parliament, and who were committed to creating a system of equal justice under
law, state agents included").
13. Kelly McCracken, Comment, Away From Justice and Fairness: The Foreign
Country Exception to the FederalTort Claims Act, 22 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 603, 603 (1989)
(stating that Congress enacted tort liability legislation in response to "judicial
antagonism" and growing criticism by scholars and commentators).
14. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2001).
15. Id. at 2674 (2001) (providing that "[tihe United States shall be liable,
respecting the provisions of this title
relating to tort claims, in the same manner
and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall
not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages").
16. Almost all states have now abolished or limited governmental immunity in
tort actions. For a thorough discussion of the logic and history behind the
abandonment of sovereign immunity, see Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557
S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1997) (listing cases where various states have abolished sovereign
immunity for tort liability); Bulman v. Hulstrand Construction Co., 521 N.W.2d
632, 639 (N.D. 1994) (same).
17. Standefer v United States, 511 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding a Federal
Torts Claims Act claim based upon a Veterans' Administration hospital's negligent
treatment of a patient who was rendered quadriplegic); Becker v. City of New
York, 140 N.E.2d 262, 268 (N.Y. 1957) (holding that the city government may be
held liable for the negligent acts of its employees under the doctrine of
respondeat superior); George McDonald, Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act,
Interplay with Statutory Claim and Notice Procedures, CAL. MED. MALPRAC. L. & PRAc.
Ch. 8 § 8.9 (1992). However, even in the first half of the twentieth century, some
jurisdictions recognized an incorporated hospital's assumed responsibility to
protect mentally ill patients from self-inflected harm. See Wetzel v. Omaha
Maternity & General Hospital Ass'n, 148 N.W. 582, 583 (Neb. 1914) (stating that
the care of a delirious patient in a private hospital must be proportionate to the
known risk of self-injury, and the hospital must be held liable if it did not act in a
reasonable way considering the circumstances); Paulen v. Shinnick, 289 N.W. 162,
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assuming responsibility for mentally ill patients when the patient
was unable to make rational decisions
Is on his or her own, and the
condition.
this
of
aware
was
hospital
Prisons, on the other hand, were treated with far less scrutiny
than hospitals or other state-run institutions. Because prisoners
were admitted for the purpose of punishment rather than
treatment, courts gave krisons far more liberty to deal with
prisoners as they wished. Protection from harm caused by other
prisoners or self-inflicted harm was often considered beyond the
scope of duty for prison officials if beyond the "reasonable care"
standard.20
Sentiment began to change in the latter half of the 1970s with
respect to the government's liability when it detained an individual
164 (Mich. 1939).
18. See Misfeldt v. Hosp. Auth. of Marietta, 115 S.E.2d 244, 248 (Ga. Ct. App.
1960) (finding hospital negligent when placing mentally disturbed patient in fourbed room instead of "psycho ward," thereby enabling patient to jump out of a
third-story window and sustain serious injuries); Martindale v. State, 199 N.E. 667,
667 (N.Y. 1935) (holding state liable for injuries sustained from fall when the state
was aware that the patient had a "desire and propensity" to escape). But see Harris
Hosp. v. Pope, 520 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (holding that the state could
not be found liable where patient jumped out window while suffering from
hallucinations when the patient's actions were not reasonably foreseeable).
19. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979) (ruling that the fact that a
prisoner is confined, combined with the prison's legitimate goals and policies, may
restrict a prisoner's constitutional rights); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948) (holding that "[I] awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal
or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system"); Meis v. Grammer, 411 N.W.2d 355,
359 (Neb. 1987) (ruling that "[m]aintaining institutional security and preserving
internal order and discipline are essential prison goals which may require the
limitation of some of a prisoner's constitutional rights"); see also Willis v. Barksdale,
625 F.Supp. 411,417-18 (W.D. Tenn. 1985). In Willis, the court held that:
the police chief's failure to provide better suicide prevention training and
to learn about and implement a new regulation and the City of Troy's
failure to employ better trained jailers do not amount to constitutional
violations because the failures arose from the allocation of resourcestime, personnel, and money, which constitutes a legitimate government
purpose.
Id.
20. See Fleishour v. United States, 365 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir. 1966)
(finding the government was not liable under the Federal Torts Claims Act when
prisoner was struck in the head with a fire extinguisher by a fellow prisoner); State
ex. rel. Wilkins v. Markway, 353 S.W.2d 727, 734 (Mo. 1962) (ruling that, in a case
involving sexual relations between prison guard and minor detainee, "the fact that
such relationship may occur with the voluntary consent of the prisoner may not be
made the basis for a recovery of actual or punitive damages from the guilty party
or from the sheriff and his bondsmen.").
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and deprived him of his ability to act independently. U.S. Supreme
Court decisions such as Ingraham v. Wight," Estelle v. Gambe, and
Hutto v. Finney' recognized that prisoners were constitutionally
entitled to protection from cruel and unusual punishment, and
that the government could be held liable if the prison willfully or
negligently denied a prisoner of this protection. These decisions
laid the groundwork for DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 25 which
provided an extensive discussion of the jailer's role in protecting
inmates from harm. 26 In DeShaney, the Court recognized that a
jailer is obligated to exercise reasonable safety in situations where a
"[s]tate by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an
individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself ....27

Furthermore, decisions such as Holland v. Breen began to
recognize exceptional circumstances where a third party may
assume liability for suicides. The Holland decision identified "bodily
security" as a liberty interest, and created a new duty for risons:
safeguarding detainees from self-inflicted harm and suicide.
21. 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (describing personal security as a fundamental
right traceable to the Magna Carta).
22. 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that indifference to prisoner's serious
illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment).
23. 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978) (extending personal security rights to
prisoners).
24. Id. The Supreme Court held that "unusual or unpredictable"
punishments known as "punitive isolation" violated the prisoners' constitutional
rights, and violated the "broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency." Id; see also Seiler v. City of Bethany, 746 P.2d
699, 701 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987) (applying Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976),
the court determined that the constitutional adequacy of inmate medical care
implicitly requires assessment of states of mind, and repeated instances of
"deliberate indifference" indicate constitutional violations on the part of prison
authorities); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 576 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that a
prisoner "continues to be protected by the due process and equal protection
clauses which follow him through the prison door.").
25. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
26. Id. at 199-200. "[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds
him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty
to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." Id.
27. Id. at 200.
28. 623 F.Supp. 284, 288 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that the mother of a
prisoner who committed suicide in his cell had a cause of action for a deprivation
of the prisoner's due process rights).
29. Holland, 623 F.Supp. at 288 (extending Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th
Cir. 1980), which held that a person should be free from the state's exercise of
brutality and excessive force).
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Many courts throughout the nation soon recognized that
liability could be imposed if a special relationship existed between
the parties, and the suicide was reasonably foreseeable.30 These
courts reasoned that, because of the actor's diminished ability to be
responsible for his own well being, the government had a
heightened responsibility to a detained individual. 31 The actor's
unless the actor was
own fault was still compared, however,
32
imminent.
was
suicide
or
ill
mentally
B. Minnesota
Although Minnesota courts did not immediately adopt the
Holland rationale, the supreme court recognized that a legal duty
on the relationship and
may exist between two
.... parties, depending
33
the foreseeability of the risk involved. Minnesota courts remained
30. See, e.g., Kanayarak v. North Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893, 897 (Alaska
1984) (recognizing the prison's liability when suicide is foreseeable); DeMontiney
v. Desert Manor Convalescent Ctr., 695 P.2d 255, 259 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that
"various mental institutions have a specific duty of care to avoid the suicide of
certain patients."); Overby v. Wille, 411 So.2d 1331, 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(ruling that a detention facility may be liable for failure to prevent foreseeable
suicide); Figueroa v. State, 604 P.2d 1198, 1203 (Haw. 1979) (holding that "[tihe
duty of penal institutions and detention homes to exercise reasonable care should
extend to protection against suicide if such an event is reasonably foreseeable.").

31.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

TORTS § 314A(4) (1965); Charles J. Williams,

Fault and the Suicide Victim: When Third PartiesAssume a Suicide Victim's Duty of SelfCare, 76 NEB. L. REv. 301, 304 (1997) (recognizing that a difference exists between
misfeasance and nonfeasance torts, and special relationships give rise to
nonfeasance torts); see also Champagne v. United States, 513 N.W.2d 75, 80 (N.D.
1994) ("[I]f the evidence shows that the patient is incapable of being responsible
for his own care and that the medical provider has undertaken the duty of care for
the patient's well-being, there would be no allocation of fault to the patient.").
32. See, e.g., Cowan v. Doering, 545 A.2d 159, 165 (N.J. 1988) (holding that
when the actions taken by a patient as a result of mental illness are the very acts
which the medical provider had a duty to prevent, the provider's failure to prevent
the suicide should not be a defense); Falkenstein v. City of Bismarck, 268 N.W.2d
787, 790-91 (N.D. 1978) (holding that suicide must be anticipated before a prison
could be held liable); Payne v. Milwaukee Sanitarium Found., 260 N.W.2d 386, 391
(Wis. 1977) (holding that "in the absence of some notice to the staff that a suicide
attempt was imminent, the hospital, as a matter of law, was not negligent if the
patient used this freedom to leave the ward and harm himself").
33. See Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792
(Minn. 1995) (holding that when a person is vulnerable and depends upon a
second person who has considerable power over the first person's welfare, and the
risk of harm is reasonably foreseeable, that this special relationship imposes a duty
on the part of the second person to protect the first from the expected harm);
Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989) (holding a
parking ramp attendant liable for the criminal acts of a third party).
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reluctant to shift fault absolutely, however, and continued the longstanding tradition of comparing fault in cases where the plaintiff
failed to exercise reasonable care for his own protection.34
It was not until a decade ago, in Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation, 5
that Minnesota began to recognize and expand the Holland
rationale. The Tomfohr court held that fault should not be
compared when a patient diagnosed with severe depression is
admitted into a hospital for the purpose of preventing suicide. 6
The court reasoned that comparative fault in this situation was not
only unnecessary, but duplicative when a jury had already been
asked to determine whether the suicide attempt was reasonably
foreseeable.3 7
Thus, Minnesota recognized the "exceptional relationship" for
the first time, thereby enhancing the duty of the traditional "special
relationship" where a detainee is completely controlled and has lost
capacity to care for himself."' Notably, the Tomfohr court placed
strict limitations on this new exception by explicitly stating that it
should be reserved for the type of factual situation presented in
that case - that of a specially-trained caregiver who has assumed
complete control over a mentally ill patient with suicidal

34. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd.1 (2000) (allowing damages in diminished
proportion according to the amount attributable to the person recovering,
provided that the person's fault does not exceed the fault of the person against
whom recovery is sought); Tomfohr v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn.
1990) (noting that the court has "liberally applied comparative fault principles
even to situations in which other jurisdictions have refused such application."); see
also Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 809 (Minn. 1981) (expanding comparative
fault to include consumer negligence, misuse, and assumption of risk); Quick v.
Benedictine Sisters Hosp. Ass'n, 257 Minn. 470, 485, 102 N.W.2d 36, 47 (1960)
(holding it appropriate to apply comparative fault using a reduced capacity
standard even if the claimant suffers from a mental deficiency or disorder);
Mesedahl v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 194 Minn. 198, 208, 259 N.W. 819, 823 (1935)
(holding that a hospital that did not specialize in treatment for the mentally ill was
not negligent for failure to prevent a patient from jumping out of a window when
the action was not anticipated). But see Zerby v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134, 140-41,
210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973) (creating an exception to the comparative fault
standard in the case of statutory language designed to protect the people in that
class from their own inability to protect themselves).
35. 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990).
36. Id. at 125. "[T]he patient could not be at fault because he lacked the
capacity to be responsible for his own well being, and... the obligation of self
care was transferred to the health care provider when it admitted the patient into
its care." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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III. THE SANDBORG DECISION

A.

Facts

In 1993, Robert Sandborg ("Sandborg") was arrested for
sexually molesting an eleven-year-old girl. 40 In his formal statement,
Sandborg admitted that he had been suicidal, but stated that, by
the time of his arrest, his suicidal tendencies

had subsided.

During the days that followed, prison guards regularly asked him
about his mental state,42 and if he was going to do anything
"foolish," to which he responded "no."4' He showed no further
signs of suicidal tendencies..

Two days later, after a visit from his mother, a custody officer
found Sandborg hanging from his bed sheets. 45 Shortly thereafter,
46
the resulting injuries caused his death.
Sandborg's mother ("Appellant") sued the county and its jail

personnel for wrongful death.4 ' At trial, the district court instructed
the jury to compare and allocate fault between Sandborg and the
county; 48 the jury found that the county and its employees were not

39. Tomfohr, 450 N.W.2d at 125 (stating that the ruling is limited to attempted
suicides committed by mentally ill patients "admitted to a locked hospital ward
where the medical staff was aware of his suicidal ideations."). But see Sandborg II,
615 N.W.2d at 64-65 (discussing the Tomfohr court's elimination of comparative
fault in any case where self-destruction is reasonably foreseeable).
40. SandborglI, 615 N.W.2d at 62-63.
41. Id. at 63. Sandborg's exact words when asked if he was thinking about
killing himself were "[a] little, not as much as before." Id.
42. Id.
43. Sandborg v. Blue Earth County, 601 N.W.2d 192, 195 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999), rev'd en banc, 615 N.W.2d 61 (Minn. 2000) [hereinafter Sandborg1].
44. Id.
In addition to the regularly recorded hourly cell checks, [the custodial
officers] each testified they performed numerous informal checks on
Sandborg while walking by the cell and didn't observe any unusual
behavior on Sandborg's part. Custody Officer Carstensen also testified
that he observed Sandborg's behavior to be normal, giving no indication
of mental illness or suicidal ideation. Id.
45. SandborglI,615 N.W.2d at 63.
46. Id. Sandborg's death occurred two days after the hanging. Id.
47. Id. at 62.
48. Id. at 62-63 (applying MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1998), which allows ajury to
determine the percentage of fault attributable to each party).
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at fault.49 Appellant moved for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict or a new trial, stating that the jury instruction was in error.50
The motion was denied, however, even though the error was
recognized,5 1 due to the court's finding that the error was
"harmless."
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the lower court's
decision, concluding that the instruction was not harmless because
the jury could have based its decision on a determination that the
county had no legal duty to protect Sandborg.5' However, the court
also concluded that the trial court had not erred with regard to the
comparative fault instructions, finding that Sandborg had the
capacity to be responsible for his own well-being and, therefore,
53
there was no reason to shift full liability to the county.
B.

The Court's Analysis

The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed with the court of
appeals' determination that a duty must exist to protect detainees
from foreseeable harm, even when that harm is self-inflicted,
because of the special relationship arising from the jailer's control
54
over the detainee. However, the supreme court reversed the court
of appeals' decision, concluding that in certain situations
comparative fault is not applicable because the third partv has
completely assumed liability for the individual's well-being. The
49. Id. at 62.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Sandborg, 601 N.W.2d at 197.
53. Id. at 198. The court of appeals held that, "[u]nlike the mentally ill
patient in Tomfohr, Sandborg had the capacity to share the responsibility for his
own well-being." Id. Therefore, the court concluded that "the trial court did not

err by instructing the jury on comparative fault under MINN.STAT. § 604.01, subd.
1." Id.
54. Sandborg II, 615 N.W.2d at 63-64 (recognizing Donaldson v. Young
Women's Christian Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995), which stated that
absent a special relationship, a third party has no legal duty to protect another,
even if that party knows or should know that action is necessary).
55. Sandborg 11, 615 N.W.2d at 64. The court applied § 452 of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,

which states:

[B]ecause the duty, and hence the entire responsibility for the situation,
has been shifted to a third person, the original actor is relieved of liability
for the result which follows from the operation of his own negligence.
The shifted responsibility means in effect that the duty, or obligation, of
the original actor in the matter has terminated, and has been replaced by
that of the third person.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS §
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court reasoned that the jailer-detainee relationship is one such
"exceptional" circumstance in which the duty to protect against a
known possibility of self-inflicted harm shifts entirely to the jailer,
and comparing the fault of the detainee is therefore not

appropriate. 56

The court held that, because of Sandborg's suicidal intentions
before his arrest, suicide was still foreseeable even after two days of
calm and rational behavior. Consequently, the county should have
taken measures to protect against the suicide. 58 Using Tomfohr as its
guide, the court ruled that comparative fault should not be applied
because Sandborg's fault was already eliminated by the
foreseeability test that determined the jail's duty.59
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SANDBORG DECISION

At first blush, it would seem that the Sandborg decision is a
logical step in the Minnesota Supreme Court's trend toward
increased third-party liability when that party assumes control over
a person's well-being•w Indeed, Minnesota courts are not alone;
throughout the United States, there has been a push by both courts
and legal scholars to severely limit the traditional nonfeasance
standard that has been the norm in tort law for centuries .6 Though
this desire to limit nonfeasance is a genuine concern, the means by
which the standard may be changed should not be conjured up
from the whimsy of the court, nor should it be concocted by
cutting and pasting obscure snippets of existing law.62 In essence,
the Sandborg court did just that - by expanding Tomfohr's liability

56.

Sandborg I, 615 N.W.2d at 64.

57. Id. at 65.
58. Id. at 64.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., Tomfohr v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1990);
Broughton v. Maes, 378 N.W.2d 134 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (extending liability in
landlord-tenant relationships); supra Part II.B.
61. See, e.g., W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56
(5th ed. 1984) (observing that the trend in the past century toward imposing
liability for nonfeasance is most pronounced where plaintiff is particularly
vulnerable and dependent on defendant).
62. See Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn. 2000) (stating
that the doctrine of stare decisis is followed in American courts to allow for stability
in the law and should be adhered to unless the principle supporting former cases
is unsound); see also Deborah M. Santello, Note, Maternal Tort Liabilityfor Prenatal
Injuries, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 747, 770 (1988) (arguing that a new duty of care
should not be created simply to achieve a desired goal).
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standard far beyond the limitations expressly set forth in Tomfohr
itself,63 and by resorting to the vaguest of Restatement
terminology, 64 the supreme court was able to justify its desired
outcome.
Realistically, the Sandborgdecision should have little impact on
the everyday functions of government.6 5 As before Sandborg,liability
is still negated if the government is sufficiently vigilant when
suicide is reasonably foreseeable. What is disturbing about this
case, however, is the means by which the supreme court arrived at
its decision, the "slippery slope" that may have been created by
relying on nebulous legal theory, and the fact that a person who
has the capacity to make rational decisions is completely relieved
from liability for his own actions. To paraphrase DeShaney, even
though the supreme court is moved by natural sympathy to find
adequate remedy for the loss of human life, we must consider who
67
actually inflicted the injury. In essence, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has abandoned stare decisis, solid legal reasoning, and a
rational individual's freedom to make his or her own decisions, all
in an effort to impose a standard the court believes just.
A. DeconstructingTomfohr:The PatchworkJustificationfor a New
Duty
The Sandborg court was persuaded by appellant's use of
Tomfohr v. Mayo Foundation to establish that comparative fault
should not apply when a third party has a duty to prevent
foreseeable self injury. 68 Unlike most special relationships, where
63. Tomfohr, 450 N.W.2d at 125.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTs§ 452 cmt. d (1965).
65. Sandborg II, 615 N.W.2d at 65 (emphasizing that the plaintiff must still
prove that the jailer breached a reasonable standard of care and that ajury could
still find ajail's actions reasonable under the circumstances).
66. Id. "The fact that the suicide occurred is not sufficient to impose liability."
Id.
67. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202-03.
Judges and lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy in
a case like this to find a way for [the decedent] and his mother to receive
adequate compensation for the grievous harm inflicted upon them. But
before yielding to that impulse, it is well to remember once again that the
harm was inflicted not by the State of Wisconsin, but by [the decedent's]
father.
Id.
68. Sandborg I1, 615 N.W.2d at 64-65. But see Sandborg I, 601 N.W.2d at 198
(rejecting appellant's use of Tomfohr because the court believed appellant's
interpretation was too broad).
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fault is compared when the
S69 plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable
care for his own protection, the court felt that the duty to protect
against self-inflicted harm shifts entirely to the jailer because the
jailer was "in total control" of the detainee's physical and mental
needs.7 0 To reinforce this argument, the court relied heavily on
section 452 of the Second Restatement of Torts, which states that,
when the duty to prevent harm is found to have shifted from the
actor to a third person, "the failure of the third person to prevent
such harm is a superseding cause."7 Comment d of the section
further states that this duty shifts in "exceptional cases" - cases
where the circumstances dictate that the original actor's duty has
terminated, and the duty has shifted completely to a third party.2
Thus, the court reasoned, because the original actor is relieved of
any duty 7in
these circumstances, he can have no fault to be
3
compared.
At first glance, this seems a solid argument. But in reality, it is a
trompe-'oeil First, Minnesota courts have never before used section
452 in any published opinion, not even in Tomfohr, let alone the
obscure comment d to that section. 75 There is good reason why the
courts have refrained from using this tool: the section, even in the
Court's own words, does not recognize any specific means to
determine whether a duty has shifted entirely to another person. 76
The Court does not provide any further guidance in Sandborg,
although it points to several "considerations" in the final comment
to the Restatement, 7 it never makes an effort to limit the effects of
69.
70.

Tomfohr v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn. 1990); see also
§ 604.01, subd. 1 (1998).
Sandborg I, 615 N.W.2d at 64.

71.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFToRTs

MINN. STAT.

§

452(2)

(1965).

72. Id. at § 452 cmt. d.
73. Sandborg I, 615 N.W.2d at 64.
74. Cassell's French Dictionary 736 (Denis Girard ed., MacMillan 1981)
(defining a trompe-l'eilas an "illusion" or "scam").
75. The Minnesota Court of Appeals did use section 452 in an unpublished
opinion, Jonas v. North End Health Ctr., 1996 WL 107405, at *2 (Minn. Ct. App.
1996), though in this decision the court found that there is generally not a duty to
prevent the harm threatened by another actor's negligent conduct.
76. Sandborg II, 615 N.W.2d at 64 (referencing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 452 cmt. f (1965), which acknowledges that "it is apparently impossible to
state any comprehensive rule as to when" circumstances completely shift
responsibility to a third party).
77. Sandborg II, 615 N.W.2d at 64. "Considerations" include "the degree of
danger and the magnitude of the risk of harm, the character and position of the
person who is to take the responsibility, his knowledge of the danger and the
likelihood he will or will not exercise proper care." Id.
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this vague yet burdensome legal theory. Instead, the court simply
states that, when suicide is "reasonably foreseeable," the detainee's
fault can no longer be considered. This lack of guidance is a
dangerous oversight.
The second major deception employed in Sandborg is the use
of Tomfohr to justify these new exceptional duties.7 9 In reality, the
Tomfohr court explicitly stated that its holding was entirely factspecific:
[W] e wish to stress that this ruling is limited to the type of
factual situation presented by this case, to-wit, an
attempted suicide committed by a mentally ill patient
admitted to a locked hospital ward where the medical staff
was aware of his suicidal ideations ....
[O]ur holding
today only stands for the proposition that cases may exist,
such as this one, where a trial judge may rule, as a matter
of law, that the patient could not be at fault because he
lacked the mental capacity to be responsible for his own
well being, and that the obligation of self care was
transferred to the health care provider when it admitted
the patient into its care. 80
The situation in Sandborg is a far cry from Tomfohr. There was
no evidence that Sandborg was mentally ill. There was nothing on
record to indicate that Sandborg Slacked
the mental capacity to be
82
responsible for his own well being. Moreover, Sandborg was not
jailed for his own protection. Consequently, there is no reason that
fault should not be compared in this situation. 3 Therefore, the
harsh, overreaching standards of section 452 should not apply.
B. Duty and Foreseeabilityin the Eyes of the Sandborg Court
The danger of the enhanced duty of Sandborg does not lie in
the imposition of this standard on jailers. As the Court stated, this
new duty does not impose a strict liability standard; if a jailer takes

78. Id. at 65.
79. Id. at 64-65.
80. Tomfohrv. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121,125 (Minn. 1990).
81. Sandborg I, 601 N.W.2d at 198. But see Sandborg 11, 615 N.W.2d at 64
(determining that "[w]hile a diagnosis of mental illness is a factor to consider
when determining whether the suicide was reasonably foreseeable, a finding of
mental illness is not necessary in making a determination regarding the
applicability of comparative fault.").
82. Sandborgl, 601 N.W.2d at 198.
83. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol28/iss3/7

14

2002]

Berglund: Torts: Taking the "I"? out of Suicide: The Minnesota Supreme Cour
TORTS: SANDBORG V. BLUE EARTH COUNTY

1321

reasonable precautions to prevent suicide and the suicide still
occurs, there can be no liability.84 Rather, the danger lies in its
vague instructions concerning to whom the duty may be imposed,
and exactly when a suicide is "reasonably foreseeable.""'
By using the unclear language of section 452 to justify its
extension of duty in Sandborg, the supreme court has "left the door
86
cracked" to further enhancement of duty. Nothing in the
Restatement limits liability strictly to health care providers or jails,
and one can imagine clever advocates stretching the new Sandborg
standard
to eventually include police
officers, school
817
administrators, and even parents of maladjusted adolescents.
Once more, these same creative souls may find "reasonable
foreseeability" in melancholy behavior and heavy metal music.""
Indeed, section 452 reads a bit like a Nostradamus prediction - one
can find what one wants to find in it; the section can be interpreted
in infinite ways, and none of those interpretations can actually be
proven incorrect.
Thus, the court took this false clairvoyance and applied it to
justify the next step in its assault on the nonfeasance liability
standard. s9 In the past, logically, only healthcare facilities that have
admitted a patient because of his suicidal ideations-and assumed
the duty to prevent those ideations from coming to fruition-could
84.

Sandborg II, 615 N.W.2d at 65; see also

MINNESOTA DIsT. JUDGES ASS'N

COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES (CIVIL)

JIG 25.40 (Michael K. Steenson & Peter B. Knapp, rep.) in 4

MINN. PRACTICE 1,
145 (4th ed. 1999) (stating that, in official immunity claims, the official must act
willfully or maliciously in order to be held accountable).
85. Sandborg II, 615 N.W.2d at 64. The Court conceded that the factors used
to determine when this new standard should be applied are "imprecise," sounding
strikingly similar to justice Potter Stewart's "I'll know it when I see it" pornography
test. SeeJim Belshaw, Free Speech Practicum,ALBUQUERQUEJ. (N.M.), Sept. 28, 2001,
at BI, availableat 2001 WL 27270551.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 452 cmt. f (1965).
87. These are examples of traditional "custodial relationships." See DANIEL
DOBBS & PAUL HAYDEN, TORTS AND COMPENSATION (3d Ed. 1997); SEE ALSO Mirand
v. City of New York, 637 N.E.2d 263, 266 (1994) (holding that "schools are under a
duty to adequately supervise the students in their charge and they will be held
liable for foreseeable injuries proximately related to the absence of adequate
supervision").
88. See James v. Meow Media, 90 F.Supp.2d 798, 819 (W.D. Ky. 2000)
(granting motion to dismiss in action against company distributing video games
that allegedly caused teen to kill other fellow students); McCollum v. Columbia
Broadcasting Systems, 249 Cal. Rptr. 187, 198 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (denying an
attempt to find record company liable for child's suicide).
89. See supra Part II.B.
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assume full liability in the event of suicide occurring. 90 Now, it
appears that the court has imposed the same liability to any
situation where an individual is detained, regardless of his ability to
make rational choices.
In jail-type situations, such harsh liability standards make little
sense. Though many detainees may be upset or angry about their
self-inflicted situations, the law should not equate such distress with
an inability to make independent choices. 91 The standard imposed
in Sandborg is simply too far down the "slippery slope." The
comparative fault standard should have been applied, as it
generally is in Minnesota when an individual's intentional acts play
a part in causing harm. 92
The danger of Sandborg applies to foreseeability as well as duty.
Previously, only inmates presenting "a strong likelihood of suicide"
were entitled to protection from self-destruction.9" This
determination was made by considering several factors, including
the recency and genuineness of the threat.94 Given that most prison
suicides occur within the first twenty-four hours of detention,9 5 and
that Sandborg showed no signs of suicide after his detention, 96 it
seems that the supreme court broadened the standard to include
potential as well as imminent suicide.97

90. See Susan O'Neal, Comment, Contributory Negligence in Medical Malpractice:
Recent Application in the Context of the SuicidalPatient, 69 Miss. L.J. 925, 933 (1999).
91. See, e.g., U.S. v. Danser, 110 F.Supp.2d 792, 803 (S.D. Ind. 1999) (finding
that, in an interview after being arrested, while circumstances of defendant's arrest
and imprisonment annoyed and even angered defendant, that annoyance and
anger were not so pronounced as to cloud or overbear his intellect and free will).
92. See Tomfohr v. Mayo Found., 450 N.W.2d 121, 123 (Minn. 1990)

(discussing the ways Minnesota has compared fault even in situations where other
jurisdictions have refused to do so).
93. James E. Robertson, Fatal Custody: A Reassessment of Section 1983 Liabilityfor
Custodial Suicide, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 807, 816 (1993).
94. Id. "Case law indicates that this threshold is not met unless the following
elements are present: (1) the inmate in question has threatened suicide or made a
suicide attempt; (2) this threat or attempt is known to jailers; and (3) is somewhat
recent and (4) appears genuine." Id.
95.

Id. at 807.

96. SandborglI,615 N.W.2d at 63.
97. Compare Sandborg II, 615 N.W.2d at 64 (stating that all jailer-detainee
relationships are exceptional circumstances where "the known possibility of selfinflicted harm transfers entirely to the jailer"), with Sandborg 1, 601 N.W.2d at 198
(applying the literal language of the Tomfohr decision, finding that, since
Sandborg did not appear mentally ill and was calm after his incarceration,
Sandborg should have had the capacity to share the responsibility for his own well
being, and therefore a full shift of liability was not appropriate).
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C. Imposing Liabilityfor the IntentionalAct of Another
Despite the supreme court's paucity of case law and its vague
guidance in terms of duty and foreseeablity, one could still make a
strong argument that these faults are, in legal parlance, "harmless
error." The court could once again address this issue (as jail
suicides are sufficiently frequent), find further cases to back up its
argument, and more accurately place limitations on duty and
foreseeability. This argument, however, overlooks the value society
places on personal responsibility.
The recent trend toward increasing liability to third parties in
suicide situations is, with only a handful98of exceptions, contrary to
both common law and common sense. Even in our enlightened
age, it seems beyond logic to shift full responsibility to a third party
when an uncoerced actor knowingly and consciously decides to act
and subsequently acts; if the actor is able to make rational choices,
there is no better individual than himself to prevent the action
from taking place.9
In a situation such as Sandborg, suicide is an intentional and
uncoerced act by a rational individual. Thus, even a detained
individual, provided that he is not mentally ill, should have the
capacity to be responsible for his own actions.1 °° To shift all liability
in a situation where a detained individual still retains his faculties
and his ability to reason is at best baffling. At worst, it is a complete
rejection of our traditional notions of fault.
V. CONCLUSION
In deciding Sandborg, the Minnesota Supreme Court had an
98. Donnie Braunstein, Note, CustodialSuicide Cases: An Analytical Approach to
Determine Liability for Wrongful Death, 62 B.U. L. REv. 177, 199 (1982) (recognizing
that many courts are reluctant to impose liability in custodial situations); see also
Snyder v. Baumecker, 708 F.Supp. 1451, 1463 (D. N.J.1989) (observing that
because of its intentional and deliberate nature, courts have generally recognized
suicide as an intervening act which is not foreseeable).
99. Daniel M. Crone, Historical Attitudes Toward Suicide, 35 DuQ. L. REv. 7
(1996)

(quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT,

in TWO

TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 302, n.23 (P. Laslett ed. 1690): "[W]henever he finds

the hardship of his Slavery out-weigh the value of his Life, 'tis in his Power, by
resisting the Will of his Master, to draw upon himself the Death he desire"); see also
Jutzi-Johnson v. U.S., 263 F.3d 753, 755 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that "when failure
to prevent a suicide is claimed to be negligent, the issue of foreseeability is
analyzed under the rubric of 'supervening cause' and the general rule is that the
negligent actor is not liable for the victim's decision to kill himself.").
100. See SandborgI,601 N.W.2d at 198.
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opportunity to reinforce the liability limitations imposed in
Tomfohr. Instead, the court set an alarming precedent concerning
foreseeability of suicide among prisoners. At the same time, the
court imposed a duty upon prison officials that should be reserved
exclusively for health care providers that have willingly, knowingly,
and voluntarily assumed responsibility for the well being of
someone who is no longer mentally capable of being able to do so
for themselves. In overruling a logical court of appeals decision, the
supreme court extended the "exceptional relationship" doctrine
well beyond its original purpose, instead of reserving this
responsibility for truly exceptional circumstances.
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